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Abstract 
This article examines the jurisprudence of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
(CCI) and the House of Federation (HoF) in resolving constitutional disputes with a 
view to identifying the principles/approaches utilized in their decisions and its 
human rights implication. These organs are entrusted with the power to interpret the 
Constitution upon application by private parties or court referral of cases. The 
article also examines patterns in the judiciary’s referral of cases for constitutional 
interpretation, and it discusses the methods and principles used by CCI/HoF in 
constitutional interpretation. Although the CCI/HoF has not expressly adopted 
distinct principles/approaches of constitutional interpretation, they can be inferred 
from the jurisprudence of the CCI and the HoF. I argue that there is inconsistent 
application of principles of constitutional interpretation. This is related with the 
incoherence observed in the constitutional interpretation of fundamental human 
rights recognized under the FDRE Constitution and ratified international human 
rights conventions. This shows that the HoF –which is a political body– has failed 
to protect basic human rights through its decisions that involve politically sensitive 
cases. There is thus the need to develop and adopt rules of procedure and principles 
of constitutional interpretation that can ensure predictability, consistency and 
coherence in HOF/CCI decisions towards the protection of human rights.  
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Ethiopia has opted for the Federal system of governance under the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (FDRE Constitution).1 The 
Constitution confers division of power between the federal and state 
governments.2 It has also established the House of Federation (HoF) entrusted 
with the functions of constitutional interpretation and the adjudication of any 
constitutional dispute among members of the federations.3 According to the 
minutes of the Constitution, the HoF is vested with such power for two reasons. 
First, the framers of the Constitution considered the Constitution as a contract 
among nationalities. These premises determined the membership of the House 
of Federation which is composed of representatives of the various nationalities 
by considering them as the sole guardians of the Constitution who should be 
entrusted with the power to review the constitutionality of laws.  
The second reason was that the framers wanted to avoid the ‘tyranny of the 
judiciary’ or ‘judicial activism/adventurism’ by empowering the judiciary with 
the power to interpret the Constitution. They seemed to have assumed that 
judicial review might give judges the discretion to use their own personal 
philosophies rather than the interest of nationalities in interpreting the 
Constitution. Because of such fear, the HoF was empowered to interpret the 
Constitution.4 In order to compensate the gaps in technical expertise among 
members of HoF in exercising constitutional interpretation, the FDRE 
Constitution established the CCI which consists of eleven members comprising 
the chief justice of the Federal Supreme Court, its deputy, six legal experts and 
three members from the HoF.5 
The constitutional supremacy clause of the FDRE Constitution stipulates that 
any law, customary practices or a decision of an organ of the state or a public 
official should not contravene the Constitution.6 This clause is authoritative over 
the Federal and State governments. Federal and state governments are expected 
                                           
Fequently used acronyms: 




Coalition for Unity and Democracy  
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
House of Federation 
1Art. 46 of the FDRE Constitution. 
2 Arts 50-52 of the FDRE Constitution. 
3 Arts 62 and 83 of the FDRE Constitution. 
4 Assefa Fiseha (2007), ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the Experience 
of the House of Federation (HoF)’, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 10 & 11. 
5 Article 84 of the Constitution and Articles 15 & 14 of Proclamation No. 798/2013, Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation. 
6 Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution. 
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to enact laws in conformity with the Constitution. The supremacy clause of the 
Constitution is enforced by the HoF which can render any law that contravenes 
the Constitution ineffective.7 The CCI/HoF exercises this power by entertaining 
any constitutional dispute that is referred to it by a court or an interested party.  
While interpreting the Constitution to resolve any constitutional dispute, 
Proclamation No. 251/2001 (enacted to consolidate the HoF) authorizes the HoF 
to identify and implement principles of constitutional interpretation as it deems 
necessary.8 Although CCI was given such authority under Article 20(1) of the 
repealed Proc. No. 250/2001, it is repealed under Proc. 798/2013. However, 
both the HoF and CCI have not developed principles of constitutional 
interpretation.9 The CCI has now drafted rules of procedure which mainly deals 
with procedural issues such as standing, hearing procedures and cases admission 
procedures but not methods or principles of interpretation.10  
The first section of this article discusses the legal grounds for court referral 
of cases. After a brief overview of originalism and non-originalism in 
constitutional interpretation (highlighted in Section 2), the third section 
discusses the principles applied by the HoF/CCI based on inference from their 
jurisprudence. The fourth section deals with the impact of the decisions of the 
CCI/HoF on human rights. 
1. Constitutional Interpretation Powers of CCI and HoF 
The Ethiopian Constitution has centralized the power of constitutional 
interpretation and review of the constitutionality of laws to a single organ, i.e., 
the HoF. According to Article 83 (1) of the FDRE Constitution, “[a]ll 
constitutional disputes shall be decided by the House of Federation.” The words 
‘all constitutional disputes’ include “any constitutional issue, whether 
legislative, executive or judicial, as long as the final determination of the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is necessary”.11 According to Article 84(1) 
of the FDRE Constitution, CCI investigates constitutional disputes and provides 
its recommendations to the HoF when there is a need for constitutional 
interpretation. 
                                           
7 Assefa, supra note 4, p. 5. 
8  Art. 7 (1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001. 
9 Interview with Yadeta Gizaw and Rehel Berhanu, experts at the Secretariat Office of 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry conducted on April 30 and May 16, 2019 in their office. 
10 Interview with Rehel Berhanu, expert at the Secretariat Office of Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry conducted on May 16, 2019. 
11 Adem Kassie (2012), The Potential Role of Constitutional Review in the Realization of 
Human Rights in Ethiopia, Pretoria University (unpublished PhD dissertation) p. 75. 
422                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3                               December 2019 
 
 
Constitutional review can be initiated by government bodies, private parties 
or through judicial referral requesting CCI to review the constitutionality of the 
contested legislation, decision or conduct.12 HoF interprets the FDRE 
Constitution and review the constitutionality of laws including proclamations 
issued by the Federal or State legislative organs, regulations, directives, and 
international agreements ratified by Ethiopia.13 This has narrowed down the 
power of courts to review the constitutionality of any law including regulations 
and directives issued by the Council of Ministers and Ministers respectively.14 
CCI provides technical support to the HoF by first investigating the case 
submitted to it for constitutional interpretation and providing its 
recommendations when there is prima facie case requiring constitutional 
interpretation or rejecting the case when there is no need for interpretation. In 
the latter case, the parties can appeal to the HoF against the decision of CCI. 
The HoF is at liberty to disregard the recommendations of CCI because of the 
advisory/recommendatory nature of the decision of the latter as it does not have 
the power to make final decisions.15 
CCI/HoF has increasingly been overloaded with cases. It has received 4,267 
cases from its establishment until April 2019. Among these cases, it has 
reviewed 2,225 cases which constitute 52% of the cases submitted for 
constitutional review as indicated in the table below. About 2,152 cases have 
been rejected by the CCI. This constitutes 96.7% of the cases. It is only about 
3.2% or 72 cases that have been decided while 2,042 cases constituting 47.8% 
of the cases submitted for review are pending before CCI. 
Table 1:  
The number of cases submitted and reviewed by HoF and CCI (until April 2019.) 
No.  Item  
No. of 
cases 
1.  Cases submitted to CCI   4267 
2.  Cases reviewed by CCI   2225 
3.  Cases decided by CCI  72 
4.  Cases decided by HoF  73 
5.  Reversed cases by HOF  8 
Source: House of Federation and Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
According to the experts at CCI, the public tends to consider CCI/HoF as an 
appellate body after cases are rejected by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
                                           
12 Takele Soboka (2011), ‘Judicial Referral of Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From 
Practice to Theory’, 19 African Journal of International and Constitutional Law, p. 104. 
13 Article 2 (2) of Proclamation No. 251/2001 consolidation of the House of the Federation 
and Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities. 
14 Assefa, supra note 4, p. 17. 
15 Article 5(2) of Proclamation No. 251/2001. See also Assefa, supra note 4, p. 14. 
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Supreme Court. Most applicants seek constitutional interpretation on issues of 
fact or legal issues which do not require constitutional interpretation. A great 
number of cases (96.7%) are thus rejected for lack of constitutional dispute or 
issues.16 
Most of the applications for constitutional interpretation at the CCI are 
submitted by private parties. It is only six out of 72 cases reviewed by the CCI 
that are referred by courts until April 2019.17 The applications by private parties 
can be made on any ground and there are no requirements on the parties to 
frame the constitutional issues. The various private parties who applly for 
constitutional interpretation include individuals, political parties, and 
associations. 
Various issues are involved in the cases submitted to CCI. The journal of the 
CCI which is published for the first time in 2018 contained 37 cases decided by 
CCI. The publication has classified the cases into 7 categories based on the 
rights that require constitutional interpretation. These categories include rights 
to property (17 cases), marriage and family related cases (2 cases), access to 
justice (7 cases), women’s rights (4 cases), equality rights (2 cases), children’s 
rights (2 cases), economic, social and cultural rights (2 cases), and supremacy of 
the constitution (one case). Large proportion of the cases brought to CCI 
involved land rights claims.18 
When a case is referred by a court for constitutional interpretation, the court 
should demonstrate the triggering factors and frame the constitutional issues. 
The factors that can constitute grounds for referral of cases to CCI/HoF from 
courts can be observed from the patterns highlighted below.  
1.1 Triggering factors for constitutional interpretation 
During application by ‘interested party’, cases usually involve abstract review of 
constitutionality while constitutional interpretation is applied on concrete 
cases/issues that are examined by CCI based on referral from courts. In case of 
                                           
16 Interview, Supra note 10. 
17 The cases are Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) vs. Melaku et al, 
File no. 141356; Coalition for Unity and Democracy v. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
Asres, Fed. First Instance Ct., Lideta Div., File No. 54024 (Decision of 3 June 2005) (26 
Ginbot 1997 E.C.); Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority vs. Ato Eyob Zewdie, Federal 
First Instance Court, File No. 218283, 2009 E.C; Prosecutor v. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem 
and Ali Delbtu, Council of Constitutional Inquiry, File No. 2356/2009 (29 Hamle 2009 
E.C.); Civil Servants Administrative Tribunal vs. FDRE Revenues and Customs Authority 
and its Moyale Branch Office, File No. 2189/09 (Tir 8, 2011 E.C. (2019)) 
18 Secretariat of Council of Constitutional Inquiry (2018), Recommendations of Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, Journal on Constitutional issues, Vol. 1(1) (ኢ.ፌ.ዴ.ሪ  የሕገመንግሥት 
ጉዳዮች አጣሪ ጉባዔ ጽ/ቤት የተዘጋጀ የሕገመንግሥት ጉዳዮች አጣሪ ጉባዔ የውሳኔ ሓሳቦች፣ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ 
ጆርናል፣ ቅፅ 1፣ ቁጥር 1፣ መስከረም 2011 ዓ/ም) 
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court referral, the court refers a case to CCI (while the case is pending before the 
court) on its own motion or upon the request of a party to the case. In both 
cases, the CCI needs to ascertain the need for constitutional interpretation.19 
The court on its part needs to show that it is unable to adjudicate the case 
applying all techniques of interpretation. It should demonstrate that the referral 
to CCI is its last resort after having tried to apply all interpretative solutions in 
conformity with the Constitution.20 When a court refers a case to CCI, it is 
expected to send the legal issue contested not the factual issue. Thus, CCI does 
not make a decision on the facts of the case but rather reviews the 
constitutionality of legislation that is contested or provide constitutional 
interpretation.21 According to Takele Soboka, “CCI and the HoF are not 
adjudicatory bodies” and they exercise “quasi-judicial powers constitutionally 
ceded to them and exercisable exceptionally when the constitutionality of a law 
is at issue”.22 This is in line with the argument that the judiciary has exclusive 
adjudicatory power. The Constitution also envisages the case to be remanded to 
the court after the decision of the HoF so that the court can decide on the merits 
of the case. 
In practice, courts frame the constitutional issues based on the constitutional 
provisions in most cases.23 However, in the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
                                           
19 Takele, supra note 12, p. 112. 
20 Id., p. 114. 
21 Assefa, supra note. 4, p. 29. 
22 Takele, supra note 12, p. 117. 
23 In Melaku’s case the court framed the issue as follows in referring the case to CCI based 
on Arts. 83(1) and 84 (2) of the Constitution: The court requested the CCI to look into: 
- Whether Art 8 (1) of Proc. No. 25/1996 (Proclamation establishing the Federal 
Courts) and Art. 7 (1) of Proc.  No. 434/2005 (Revised Proclamation providing for 
Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence on Anti-Corruption) is contrary to Articles 
20 (6), 25, 10 and 13 (1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
- Whether it is the Federal High Court or federal Supreme Court that has the material 
jurisdiction to entertain the case? 
         See Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) v. Melaku et al; File No. 
141356. In a terrorism case involving three accused persons, the court framed the 
constitutional issue as follow in referring the case to CCI: 
- Whether witness protection through withholding of names and identity of witnesses 
under Article 32 (1) of Proc. No.  652/2009 and Article 4 (H) & (J) is constitutional 
in light of Article 20 (4) of the FDRE Constitution 
         See Prosecutor vs. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem and Ali Delbtu, Federal High Court; File 
No. 192735 (14/9/2009 E.C) 
         In a case referred to the CCI by the Civil Servant Tribunals, the Tribunal requested 
CCI to evaluate the constitutionality of the provision of the Regulation which prohibits the 
Judiciary from reviewing the decision of the Director General of Ethiopian Revenues and 
Custom Authority to dismiss an employee in light of Art. 37 (1) and 20(4) of the FDRE 
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(CUD) case24 –which challenged the issuance of Directive by the then Prime 
Minister banning outdoor assemblies and demonstrations in Addis Ababa and its 
vicinities during the a May 2005 elections– the court framed a question of 
factual application to the case rather than a constitutional issue. The court did 
not attempt to contest the constitutionality of the law invoked by the parties. It 
rather framed the issue which examined whether it ‘was the directive of the 
Prime Minister [which banned outdoor meetings and demonstrations for one 
month] in contravention of the Constitution?’ This issue only requires factual 
application of the law. The court was left with no other factual determination 
after the CCI decided answering the issue framed.25 According to Sisay,  
the Court erred in failing to refer the case to the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry (the Council) without considering the provisions of Proclamation No. 
3/1991 and without first deciding on whether there was lack of clarity of the 
Constitution; and the Council failed to decide on whether there was 
‘constitutional dispute’ giving rise to its jurisdiction.26 
Similarly, Takele Soboka is of the view that “the Court not only failed to 
specify a provision that needed interpretation but also failed to frame question of 
law while the Council went beyond its power to apply the Constitution to factual 
situation”.27 But in other cases referred by courts, courts properly made 
reference to the specific provisions that need interpretation or determination of 
constitutionality.28 
In Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the CCI should have made its 
decision in abstract. However, it went beyond its power and applied the law to 
the facts. The Council relied on the constitutional provision providing state of 
emergency rather than relying on the explicit provision of the Constitution 
stipulating the power of the Prime Minister. It further determined whether the 
factual circumstances warrant the state of emergency rather than determining 
whether the Prime Minister has the power to issue a state of emergency.29 In its 
ruling, the CCI held that the factual evaluation of the ban demonstrates that it 
                                                                                                            
Constitution and Article 14(3)(b)&(e) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See 
Prosecutor vs. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem and Ali Delbtu, Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry, File No. 2356/2009 (29 Hamle 2009 E.C.) 
24 Coalition for Unity and Democracy vs. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres, Fed. First 
Instance Ct., Lideta Div., File No. 54024 (Decision of 3 June 2005) (26 Ginbot 1997 E.C.) 
25 Takele, supra note 12, p. 118. 
26 Sisay Alemahu (2008), “The Justiciability of Human Rights in the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia”, 8 African Human Rights Law Journal. p. 273. 
27 Takele, supra note 12, p. 100. 
28 Supra note 23. 
29 Adem, supra note 11, pp. 87 and 211. 
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was necessary and Prime Minister’s declaration of the ban on demonstration and 
assembly was constitutional.30 
Similarly, in a terrorism case referred to the CCI by the Federal High Court31, 
CCI applied the law to the facts of the case.32 It argued that the court should 
have not referred the constitutional issue. The court framed the issue in this case 
as to “whether witness protection through withholding of names and identity of 
witnesses under Article 32(1) of Proclamation No. 652/2009 (Anti-terrorism 
Proclamation) and Article 4(H) & (J) of Proclamation No. 699/2010 (which 
should have been stated as Proclamation No. 699/2011 in the Negarit Gazeta) is 
constitutional in light of Article 20 (4) of the FDRE Constitution”. However, the 
CCI pointed that the determination of this issue is not relevant to the case which 
is pending before the court. Here, it made analysis of the facts of the case. This 
should have been left for the judiciary to decide. It held that Article 32(1) of 
Proclamation No. 652/2009 and Article 4(H) & (J) of Proclamation No. 
699/2010 are constitutional in light of Article 20(4) of the FDRE Constitution. 
However, the CCI should have used this opportunity to review the 
Constitutionality of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation in light of the human rights 
provisions of the Constitution. 
1.2 Grounds for court referral  
When courts refer a case to CCI, they do not have to establish that there is a 
prima facie case of unconstitutionality. However, they have to review the case 
and believe in the need for constitutional interpretation. According to Article 
21(2) of Proclamation No. 251/2001, the Court handling the case “shall submit 
it to the CCI only if it believes that there is a need for constitutional 
interpretation in deciding the case”. Although the court refers to issues of fact 
and law, the CCI entertains cases in abstract by interpreting the Constitution 
without having to go into the merits of the case.33 
In other jurisdictions, the principle of avoidance is applied by courts more 
often. Mostly, courts tend to indirectly apply the Constitution. This means that 
“where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a 
                                           
30 Takele, supra note 12, pp. 119-220. 
31 Prosecutor vs. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem and Ali Delbtu, Federal High Court, File No. 
192735 (14/9/2009 E.C) 
32 Prosecutor vs. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem and Ali Delbtu, Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry, File No. 2356/2009 (29 Hamle 2009 E.C.) 
33Adem, supra note 11, p. 77; In case of the diffuse system which is applied in the USA, the 
supreme court provides interpretation of the constitution on concrete case before it while 
in case of concentrated system a separate organ which can be Constitutional court or a 
separate special body interprets the constitution on an abstract case. See also Takele, 
supra note 12, p. 104. 
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constitutional issue that is the course which should be followed”. Courts mostly 
rely on ordinarily legislation to avoid referring the case for constitutional 
interpretation.34 However, the trend in Ethiopia shows that courts easily 
relinquish their jurisdiction over constitutional disputes and refer a case to the 
CCI/HoF.35 This is mainly related with two factors highlighted below. 
1.2.1 The tendency to avoid issues that involve the application of a 
constitutional provision 
The first factor that has created the tendency of courts to relinquish their 
jurisdiction over constitutional disputes is the view by courts that any issue that 
involves interpretation and application of constitutional provision requires 
referral of the case to the CCI/HoF. This emanates from Article 83(1) of the 
FDRE Constitution which provides that ‘all constitutional disputes’ shall be 
decided by the HoF.36 For instance, in one of the cases which was referred to the 
CCI by the Federal First Instance Court37 to determine whether the favourable 
provision of Proclamation No. 983/2008 should be applicable to the applicant 
who is serving his sentence based on the provisions of Proclamation No. 
285/1994, the court framed the issue based on the contradictory meaning given 
to ‘conviction’ under the Amharic and English versions of Article 22(2) of the 
FDRE Constitution.  
The Amharic version provides that a sentenced person can benefit from 
favourable punishment by applying it retroactively. The court in this case could 
have directly applied the constitutional provision which explicitly provides that 
the Amharic version prevails in case of contradiction between the Amharic and 
English versions of the provisions of FDRE Constitution.38 In the terrorism case 
mentioned above which was referred to the CCI, the Federal High Court unduly 
relinquished its power by referring the case involving a constitutional provision 
to CCI.39 The case involved three individuals accused of terrorism based on the 
previous anti-terrorism proclamation (Proclamation No. 652/2009). They argued 
that they have not received the specific name of the witnesses to the case and 
places where the crime was allegedly committed. They argued that these 
prevented them to prepare their defence being fully aware of the evidence 
presented against them. It was noted that Article 20(4) of the FDRE Constitution 
                                           
34 Takele, supra note 12, p. 107. 
35 Id., p. 100. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority v.  Eyob Zewdie, Federal First Instance Court, 
File No. 218283, 2009 E.C.  
38 Article 106 of the FDRE Constitution provides that the Amharic version of the 
Constitution will have a final legal authority. 
39 Prosecutor vs. Mohadi Ali, Ahmed Adem and Ali Delbtu, Federal High Court, file no. 
192735 (14/9/2009 E.C) 
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guarantees the right (of accused persons) to full access to any evidence 
presented against them. The court referred the case to the CCI to determine 
whether protection of witness under Article 32(1) of Proclamation No. 
652/200940 and Article 4 (H) & (J) of Proc. No. 699/2010 is constitutional in 
light of Article 20(4) of the FDRE Constitution. However, the court could have 
applied the constitutional provision directly. As argued by Sisay:  
The Ethiopian Constitution enshrines provisions specific enough to be 
applied by courts (examples are rights of persons under arrest and rights of 
the accused under Articles 19 and 20 respectively). Moreover, … there are 
constitutional rights which do not have a perfect substitute in ordinary 
legislation. An example is the right of accused persons to ‘full access to any 
evidence presented against them’ under Article 21(4) of the Constitution. 
Courts cannot totally avoid referring to constitutional rights, especially in the 
latter cases.41 
Courts should abstain from any referral of cases at all times merely because a 
constitutional provision is invoked. However, the FDRE Constitution does not 
have a limitation clause which guides the determination of the constitutionality 
of a limitation, and thus courts might face difficulty in applying constitutional 
provisions which involve limitation clauses. In such cases, courts should refer 
the case to CCI to get an interpretation on constitutionality of any limitation on 
the constitutional rights. 
1.2.2 Avoidance of politically sensitive issues 
The second reason for the tendency of courts to relinquish their power in favour 
of CCI is that courts want to avoid politically sensitive issues. When courts are 
faced with politically sensitive issues, they tend to refer the case to CCI/HoF 
which is more of a political organ.42 This was what was pursued by the court in 
the CUD case and Melaku’s case.43 In the CUD case which involved the 
banning of demonstration and assembly by the then Prime Minister in 2005, the 
court referred the case to the CCI despite the objection of the applicant. In this 
case, CUD brought the case before the Federal First Instance Court by relying 
on Proclamation No. 3/1991 that provides for procedures of demonstration and 
public political meetings. CUD tried to base its argument on the Proclamation to 
                                           
40 Article 32 of Proclamation No. 652/2009 provides that the court may allow the 
withholding of names and identity of witnesses for the purpose of witness protection. 
41 Sisay, supra note 25. p. 284. 
42 Takele, supra note 12, p. 101. 
43 Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) V. Melaku et al, file no. 141356, 
in House of Federation, Journal of Constitutional Decisions, 2009 E.C. (2017), Vol. 2 (2),  
p. 7-30 and Coalition for Unity and Democracy v. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres, 
Fed. First Instance Ct., Lideta Div., File No. 54024 (Decision of 3 June 2005) (26 Ginbot 
1997 E.C.);  
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avoid the referral of the case to a political organ (CCI) if constitutional 
provision is cited as the basis of its argument. However, the court referred the 
case to CCI against the open opposition of the complainant. This shows the 
tendency of courts to avoid rendering decisions on politically sensitive cases.  
Similarly, in Melaku’s case, the court on its own initiation referred the case 
to the CCI. The case involved a General Director of the Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority who has been accused (before the Federal High Court) based 
on Articles 8(1) Proclamation No. 25/1996 and Article 7 (1) of Proclamation 
No. 434/2005. The proclamations required Ministers or state officials of the 
Federal government to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme 
Court for crimes in connection with their official positions/responsibilities. 
Thus, the court requested CCI to determine constitutionality of the 
proclamations in light of the right to appeal and equal protection before the law 
guaranteed under Articles 20(1) and 25 of the FDRE Constitution. The issue 
framed by the court was ‘whether the adjudication of the case of Melaku Fanta 
who was Director General of Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority with a 
Minister portfolio before the Federal Supreme Court restricts his constitutional 
right to appeal’. The court requested this despite the fact that it could have 
applied the ordinary law. Even though on its face value, the judiciary’s referral 
seemed to seek the protection of the accused person’s constitutional right of 
appeal, the real reason behind the court referral was the judiciary’s preference to 
defer political issues.  
2. Originalism and Non-originalism in Constitutional 
Interpretation  
There are various principles/theories on constitutional interpretation that have 
acquired recognition in various countries. In the USA and other countries, the 
following theories and principles were used by the federal and state courts to 
interpret the Constitution. 
2.1 The theory of originalism  
This theory is invoked by US Federal and State courts.44 Originalism theory is 
defined as both original-intent originalism and original-public-meaning 
originalism.45  However, the theory is criticized for disregarding constitutional 
interpretation based on contemporary meanings, values or understandings of a 
constitution.46 
                                           
44 Jeremy M. Christiansen (2017), ‘Orginalism: The Primary Canon of State Constitutional 
Interpretation’, the Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol. 15, p. 344. 
45 Id., p. 348. 
46 Jeffrey Goldsworthy (2009), ‘Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism’, Philosophy 
Compass, Vol. 4, Issue 4, p. 689. 
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a) Original intent- is considered as the primary canon of interpretation and gives 
primacy “to the intent and purpose of the framers of the constitutional 
provision and of the people who adopted it”.47 
b) Original public-meaning (Textual interpretation)- refers to constitutional 
interpretation conducted according to the original meaning of the 
constitution.48 Textualist approach as opposed to the intentionalist paradigm 
focus on “the spirit and intent of [the] framers, as indicated by [the 
documents’] language”.49 According to textual interpretation, constitutional 
interpretation should be “in light of ordinary language, the circumstances 
attending its formation, and the construction placed upon it. ...”50 
2.2 Non-originalism in constitutional interpretation  
Non-originalism is the second type of constitutional interpretation which takes 
into account contemporary contexts and understanding of a constitution. It 
includes the following. 
a) Living constitutionalism:  It started to be applied since early twentieth century 
in the USA. The Constitution is considered as living document with changing 
terminologies with the change in the time and circumstances. The 
Constitution is expected to meet the demands of a progressive society and 
embrace extensive relations.51 Jack M. Balkin argued that this theory should 
not be considered as theory of constitutional interpretation, but should rather 
be regarded as constitutional construction. According to Balkin, constitutional 
construction is a “process of building institutions of government and 
implementing and applying the constitutional text and its underlining 
principles”. He also contends that the theory is applicable to citizens, not to 
constitutional judges. This theory explains how constitutional change occurs 
in the interaction between the political branches and courts.52 
b) Lockstep interpretation: It means ‘interpreting a state provision to mean the 
same thing the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted an analogous federal 
provision’.53 This is also similar to pragmatist approach which gives more 
weight to judicial precedent.  
c) Totality of the circumstances approach or “Motley Constellation”/Factor 
framework: According to this interpretative framework, history, and structure 
                                           
47 Jeremy M. Chirstiansen, supra note 44, pp. 356 & 363. 
48 Id., p. 343. 
49 Id., p. 350. 
50 Id., p. 348. 
51 Id., p. 359. 
52 Jack M. Balkin (2009), Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, Yale Law 
School Faculty Scholarship, p. 550. 
53 Jeremy M. Chirstiansen, supra note 44, p. 360. 
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of the constitution, other factors based on “contemporary understandings of 
applicable economic and sociological norms” are also important factors to be 
considered in constitutional interpretation in addition to the text of the 
constitution.54 
d) Natural Law theory provides that a higher moral law prevails over the 
constitution and the constitution should be interpreted according to these 
rules.55 
Original meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are taken as 
contradictory. However, Jack M. Balkin proposed a method that combines the 
two together which he called ‘method of text and principle’. This method allows 
the application of text and principles based on the needs of the time. This 
requires building political institutions, passing legislation, and creating judicial 
and non-judicial precedents.56 
3. Principles and Approaches of Interpretation in HoF Decisions 
The FDRE Constitution does not provide principles/methods of constitutional 
interpretation except for the interpretation of provisions on fundamental rights 
and freedoms which should be interpreted in conformity with the principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), international covenants on 
human rights and international instruments adopted by the Ethiopia.57 The 
preamble of the Constitution, the principles enshrined under Articles 8-12 of the 
FDRE Constitution58 and the prevalence of the Amharic version of the 
Constitution over the English version (in case of ambiguity of its provisions) can 
be considered as statutory interpretation guides.59 
Both the CCI and HoF do not have detail rules on approaches or methods of 
interpretation to be applied in the cases before them.60 Their approaches can 
only be inferred from the jurisprudence of their decisions. In practice, CCI/HoF 
                                           
54 Id., p. 358 & 362. 
55 R. Randall Kelso (1994), ‘Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main 
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History’, Valparaiso 
University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 159. See also Michael S. Moore (2001), 
‘Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation’, Fordham Law 
Review. Vol. 69, No. 5, p. 2088. 
56  Jack M. Balkin, (2009), supra note 52. 
57 Article 13 (2) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 7 (2) of Proclamation No. 251/2001. 
58 These principles include popular sovereignty, supremacy of the constitution, respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms, secularism, government transparency and 
accountability. 
59 Mustefa Nasser (2018), Methods of Constitutional Interpretation in Constitutional 
Dispute Settlement in Ethiopia, (unpublished LL.M thesis), School of Law, Addis Ababa 
University, p. 18-20. 
60 Id., 59, p. 30. 
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has applied various approaches in interpreting the Constitution. It is important to 
note that a single decision may apply one or more methods or principles of 
interpretation. The cases highlighted below indicate the approach pursued by 
CCI/HoF to interpret the FDRE Constitution. 
3.1 Textual interpretation 
The textual interpretation model endorses that the interpretation of a constitution 
should focus on what the law basically asserts through the literal and technical 
meaning of its provisions.61 It asserts that the words of a constitution are to be 
taken at face value and given ordinary and accepted meaning.62 
The HoF has mostly applied textual interpretation in interpreting the FDRE 
Constitution.63 Most of the cases on land rights issues decided by the CCI and 
HoF apply textual interpretation in addition to considering policy issues behind 
those provisions. For instance, in the cases of Aliye Dawe vs. Mumad Adem, 
Hasay Doye vs. Tinsaye Kutale et. al, Banchamlak Dersolgn vs. Abebaw Mola, 
Kelebe Tesfa vs. Ayelegn Derbew, and Muyedin Yunis vs. Nassi Aliye et. al, the 
HoF relied on the literal application of Article 40(3) of the FDRE Constitution 
which provides that “[l]and is the common property of the Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of 
exchange.” In these cases, the court’s decision was found to be contrary to this 
provision of the Constitution as it relied on contractual interpretation.64 
In most cases, the CCI and HoF invalidated various private dealings on land 
that resulted in the eviction of the original holders of the land. In the case of Ato 
Ketefo Gebreeyes and W/ro Denekenesh Jima65, CCI invalidated donation of 
land given by applicants who have no other means of livelihood and they 
donated the land to the respondents believing that the latter will support them in 
                                           
61 Brandon J. Murrill (2018), Modes of Constitutional Interpretation. Congressional 
Research Service Report, p. 5. 
62 Craug R. Ducat (2009), Constitutional Interpretation, 9th Edition, Wadsworth, Cengage 
Learning, p.77. 
63 Interview with Ato Yawekal Bekele, Director of the Directorate on Constitutional 
Interpretation and Identify Issues, House of Federation, conducted on 6 June 2019.  
64 Aliya Dawe v. Mumad Adem case is about the sale of land which the applicant requested 
to be returned. The Court accepted the validity of the sale. However, the HoF nullified the 
sale of the land. In the case of Hasay Doye vs. Tinsaye Kutale et.al, the HoF nullified a 
court decision that validated a sale of rural land based on article 40 (3) of the FDRE 
Constitution. The other cases (Banchamlak Dersolgn vs. Abebaw Mola, Kelebe Tesfa vs. 
Ayelegn Derbew, and MuyedinYunis vs. Nazi Aliye et. Al) also involved the sale of rural 
land which was held unconstitutional based on the provision of the Constitution 
prohibiting sale of land.  See Mustefa, supra note 59, p. 29-30.  
65Ato Kitifo Gebreyes and W/ro Deneknesh Jimma vs. Besufikade Ayele, 2009 E.C (2017), 
File No. 1663/08 in supra note 18, pp. 14-16. 
The Jurisprudence and Approaches of Constitutional Interpretation by the HoF in Ethiopia             433 
 
 
old age. They also argued that they are illiterate and did not understand the 
contract of donation upon signing. The CCI invalidated the agreement based on 
Article 40(4) of the Constitution which provides that Ethiopian peasants have 
the right to be protected from any eviction from their possession of rural land.  
Similarly, in W/ro Kassaye Eshete vs. W/ro Askale Zemedkun, there were 
issues which involved division of rural land acquired before marriage. The CCI 
applied a constitutional provision that protects peasants from eviction and stated 
that the wife who has contributed through undertaking various developmental 
activities on the land during marriage should benefit from the equal division of 
the land upon divorce. The decision noted that the wife does not have any other 
land of her own and stated that she should get equal division from the land 
although the land was acquired by the husband before marriage and registered in 
his name by taking cognizance of women’s lack of access to land.66  
The CCI here had a policy consideration of availing fair access to land to 
women rather than application of textual interpretation. However, the HoF 
stated that according to the Amhara Regional State Proclamation on Rural Land, 
the land acquired before marriage and registered only in the husband’s name is 
considered as personal property and cannot be subject to equal division among 
the spouses upon divorce.67 This has a bad implication on women’s right to 
access, use and administer land. The facts on the ground show that women have 
a limited access to land as a result of cultural practices limiting women’s access 
to land. Since land is owned by the state and the people, it should not be 
considered as personal property and should be subjected to equal division upon 
divorce when one of the spouses do not have any other land. This line of 
interpretation clearly departs from literal interpretation, and the HoF should 
have accordingly considered the rights of peasants to be protected from any 
eviction as it did in other decisions. 
Contrary to their decision in W/ro Kassaye Eshete vs. W/ro Askale Zemedkun, 
in the case of W/ro Halima Mohamed vs. Ato Adem Abdi, both CCI and HoF 
stated that a husband who inherited his deceased brother’s wife should not get 
equal division of the land which the wife jointly acquired during her previous 
marriage. The CCI stated that since the husband has another land acquired 
through succession in his second marriage, the land from which he claimed his 
share should be considered as personal property. It also argued based on the 
provision of the Constitution that protects women’s rights. In its reasoning, it 
provided that allowing equal sharing of the land to the second husband will 
                                           
66 W/ro Kassaye Eshete vs. W/ro Askale Zemedkun (guardian of TsehayeTameri), September, 
2011 E.C (2018), FDRE House of Federation 4th year ordinary Meeting, p. 3 available on 
<http://www.hofethiopia.gov.et/web/guest/decisions-documents/-
/document/preview/29272/29114>.  Accessed on 1 June 2019. 
67 W/ro Kassaye Eshete vs. W/ro Askale Zemedkun, Id., p. 4. 
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promote bigamy and the practice of widow inheritance and also deprives the 
children born out of the previous marriage their inheritance rights contrary to the 
best interest of the child principle enshrined under the Constitution.68 The HoF 
endorsed the reasoning of CCI and decided that the equal division of the land 
which was acquired during previous marriage will deprive the woman from her 
right to access, administer and control land and also affects the best interest of 
the children.69 This decision is not in conformity with the decision in W/ro 
Kassaye Eshete vs. W/ro Askale Zemedkun discussed above. 
In another case referred by the Federal First Instance Court,70 the CCI had to 
determine whether the favourable sentencing provision of Proclamation No. 
983/2008 should be applicable to the applicant, –who is serving his sentence 
based on the provisions of Proclamation No. 285/1994. The CCI applied textual 
interpretation in addition to giving consideration to the ‘spirit’ of the law. The 
Court that referred the case framed the issue based on the contradictory meaning 
given to ‘conviction’ under the Amharic and English versions. According to the 
Amharic version a sentenced person can benefit from favourable punishment by 
applying it retroactively while the English version provides that it is applicable 
to accused and convicted persons.  
The existing law does not provide any procedure for a sentence to be 
reviewed by a court when a favourable law is enacted. Proclamation No. 
983/2008 introduced a lower sentence of 3 to 15 years while 10-15 years was 
imposed in the previous proclamation (Proclamation No. 285/1994) for a crime 
related to VAT fraud. The CCI analysed whether the beneficiaries from the 
favourable applicable punishment should be accused/convicted defendants or 
persons who are sentenced. CCI inferred from Article 22(2) of the FDRE 
Constitution that a favourable provision under a new law is applicable to an 
accused or convicted person. Here, CCI relied on the meaning of the text of the 
Constitution which refers to the convicted person (which in this case referred to 
persons who are found guilty and awaiting the decision on their sentence). CCI 
noted that the spirit of the Constitution applies to persons who are convicted 
(but not yet sentenced) but not to persons who are already sentenced.  CCI in 
this case rejected the case stating that there is no need for constitutional 
interpretation since the Constitution can be applied without any interpretation. 
However, the reliance of the CCI on the text of the English version of the 
                                           
68 W/ro Halima Mohamed vs. Ato Adem Abdi; File No. 713/04 in House of Federation, 
Journal of Constitutional Decisions, 2009 E.C., Vol. 2 (2),  p. 64. 
69 Id., p. 68-69. 
70 File No. 2321/09; Date of decision: 14/10/2009 Ethiopian calendar (2017). The case was 
first entertained at the Federal First Instance Court between Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority (represented by its Prosecutor) vs. Ato Eyob Zewde, File no. 218283, 
Ginbot 23, 2009, Ethiopian Calendar. (Copy of the decision is on file with author) 
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Constitution without considering the contradictory provisions of the Amharic 
versions resulted in the rejection of the case. The CCI should have considered 
the constitutional principle which provides that the Amharic version of the 
constitution would have the final authority.71 
Textual interpretation has also been applied in cases that involved the 
determination of the ‘best interest of the child’.72 In these cases, the CCI/HoF 
applied the provision of the Constitution which requires all actions concerning 
children undertaken by public and private welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies to take the best interest of the 
child as primary consideration.73 
The above analysis of the jurisprudence of the CCI/HoF demonstrates that 
both institutions frequently relied on the principle of textual interpretation which 
in some cases has resulted in wrong conclusions. The literal meaning of the text 
of a Constitution may not, at times, result in the protection of individual rights 
unless it is interpreted in conjunction with the spirit of the Constitution or other 
human rights provisions of the Constitution.  
3.2 Harmonious construction (right balancing analysis) 
Harmonious construction is an approach that provides that “the constitutional 
provision should not be construed in isolation from all other parts of the 
Constitution, but should be construed as to harmonize with those other parts”.74 
Accordingly, a constitutional provision “should be given a meaning and an 
application which does not lead to conflict with other articles and which 
confirms with the Constitution’s general scheme”.75 
The HoF applied this approach in its decision on the right to vote and be 
elected in Benshangul.76 The case involved the prohibition of candidates from 
Amhara, Oromo and Tigray nationalities in Benshangul from participating in the 
2000 elections for the Regional Council. The prohibition by the National 
Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) was based on the inability of candidates to 
speak one of the five local languages i.e., Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and 
Mao. The Amharas, Oromos and Tigray were resettled in Benishangul during 
                                           
71 Article 106 of the FDRE Constitution. 
72 See W/ro Halima Mohamed vs. Ato Adem Abdi, File No. 713/04 in Journal of 
Constitutional Decisions, 2009 E.C, Vol. 2(2), pp. 58-69; Ato Birhanu Regassa Urgi v. 
Meskerm Mitiku and Emahoy G/Eyesus (Surafeal Zewdu’s mother), supra 18, pp. 137-142. 
73 Article 36 (2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
74 Rajashree J Jawale, Principles of Constitutional Interpretation available on 
https://www.slideshare.net/sundarsasane/principles-of-constitutional-interpretation-of-list 
(accessed on 15 May 2019) 
75 Ibid. 
76 Decision on right to vote and be Elected in Benshangul (Benshangul case) in House of 
Federations, Journal of Constitutional Decisions, 2000 E.C. (2008), Vol. 1 (1),  p. 14-34 
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Derg’s resettlement programmes, and they constituted 47 percent of the 
population of the region.77 The CCI in its majority vote decided that the 
prohibition is against the constitutional provision that provides for the right to be 
elected, and decided that the decision of the NEBE is unconstitutional.  
However, the minority members of CCI noted that CCI should consider not 
only the specific provision but also look into the whole Constitution which 
guarantees the right to self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples. It 
noted that there is a need to balance the right to be elected and the rights of 
nationalities. It stated there is no discrimination on the basis of language thereby 
considering that decision of NEBE as constitutional. Based on this CCI minority 
decision, the HoF decided that a candidate needs to know the working regional 
language but not the local language. However, NEBE’s decision requiring the 
candidates to speak the local language was found unconstitutional. The 
constitutional interpretation applied by the majority is textual reading while the 
minority decision not only made textual reading of specific provisions of the 
Constitution, but also referred to the spirit of the Constitution which aims to 
balance individual rights and rights of nationalities.  
The same principle is applied in the case of Ato Wesen Alemu et. al vs. The 
Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) Justice Professionals Training 
Institute. The case involved denial of visually impaired experts in law from 
becoming a judge. The HoF considered such denial as a violation of Articles 25 
and 41(2) of the FDRE Constitution, Proclamation No. 676/2010 and the 
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.78 In this 
case, the HoF looked into the text of the Constitution and referred to the whole 
constitutional text. This decision can be considered as one of the decisions of the 
HoF which is pro-human rights. In general, harmonious construction –which 
would have resulted in fair decisions in various cases– is not applied by 
CCI/HoF as extensively as textual interpretation. 
3.3 Interpretation based on international human rights instruments 
This interpretation is applied by referring to international human rights 
instruments ratified by Ethiopia. In Ato Melaku Fenta’s case,79 the CCI and HoF 
invoked international human rights instruments to strengthen thier analysis on 
the right to appeal. They also made reference to the purpose of the law to 
determine whether Melaku’s right to appeal is affected by the adjudication of his 
case by the Federal Supreme Court. CCI/HoF stated that Proclamation No. 
                                           
77 Assefa, supra note 4, p. 23. 
78 Mustefa, supra note 59, p. 36. 
79 Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) vs. Ato Melaku et al, File No. 
141356, in House of Federation, Journal of Constitutional Decisions, 2009 E.C. (2017), 
Vol. 2 (2),p. 7-30. 
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25/1996 which requires government officials to be tried by the Federal Supreme 
Court restrains their right to appeal and, in effect, violates equality before the 
law based on international human rights instruments such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and African Charter on Human 
and peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).  
The CCI/HoF stated that the right to appeal is one of the rights recognized 
under the FDRE Constitution. The decison also noted that the denial of the right 
to appeal affects the chance to correct error in decisions which goes against the 
principle of fairness. It underlined that appeal is instrumental to ensure 
uniformity, predictability of decisions and accountability of judges. 
Furthermore, CCI/HoF noted that the right to equal protection before the law 
prohibits any discrimination based on political opinion, religion etc.  
The other landmark case that invokes international instruments is the Kedija 
Case. The case involved the constitutionality of adjudication by a religious court 
(Nai’ba court) on the basis of Sharia law against the consent of the applicant. 
Before its submission to the Council, appeal was lodged to the Supreme Sharia 
Court and finally to Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The 
applicant was assisted by the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) 
in bringing the case to the CCI which provided its recommendation to the HoF 
stating that the right of the applicant was violated. It pointed that the applicant 
should have been allowed to express her consent before the case was entertained 
by a religious court. In this regard, the interpretation made by the HoF was 
based on the right guaranteed under the FDRE Constitution and international 
human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia. 
In Ato Wesen Alemu et. al vs. Amhara National Regional State Justice 
Professionals Training Institute (which involved denial of visually impaired 
experts from becoming a judge), the HoF indicated that such denial is against 
Articles 25 and 41(2) of the FDRE Constitution and the International 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.80 The CCI/HoF in the 
above cases only cited the provisions of the Constitution and international 
human rights instruments. The decision did not elaborate the provisions using 
General Comments and international human rights jurisprudence on the issue.81 
3.4 Legislative intent 
In this approach, interpretation is made based on the intent of the legislator 
which can be inferred from the history of drafting and adopting the law. This 
                                           
80 Mustefa, supra note 59, p. 36. 
81 General Comments are issued by human rights treaty bodies interpreting treaty provisions. 
The core human rights instruments ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CEDAW, CRPEW, CAT, 
CERD, CED and ICRMWF have monitoring treaty bodies/Committees which interpret 
the treaty provisions by adopting General Comments. 
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approach takes into account circumstances which gave rise to the adoption of 
the Constitution or legislation.82 Although the CCI and HoF have mentioned the 
purpose of a constitutional provision in most instances, they did not refer or cite 
the intent of the framers of the Constitution by referring to sources of legislative 
intent such as minutes documented during the drafting and approval processes 
of the Constitution.83 It is in very few cases that the CCI and HoF considered the 
intention of the legislator in reference to their interpretation of a certain 
legislative provision.84 
4. Implications of Lack of Principles/Methods of Interpretation 
on Human Rights  
CCI/HoF has made decisions that have positive and negative implications on 
human rights. An overview of decisions that fall under both categories show the 
need for principles/ methods of interpretation, the absence of which has adverse 
implications on human rights. 
4.1 Decisions in tandem with human rights  
There are cases that have applied international human rights provisions and 
principles and fundamental rights incorporated in the FDRE Constitution such 
as the best interest of the child, right to appeal, access to justice.85 In Civil 
Servants Administrative Tribunal vs. FDRE Revenues and Customs Authority 
and its Moyale Branch Office, the CCI has (yet awaiting the final decision by 
HoF) invalidated the power of the Director General of Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority to dismiss employees.86 This is indeed commendable. 
This case was held constitutional in Ato Ashenafi Amare et al vs. the 
Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA) that challenged the 
constitutionality of the provision in the regulation which prohibits judicial 
review of the decision of the Director General. Ato Ashenfi was dismissed from 
(ERCA) based on Regulation No. 155/2007 that allowed the General Director of 
the Customs and Revenue Authority to dismiss employees on the ground of 
                                           
82 Muthomi, supra note 61. 
83 Supra note 70. 
84 Ato Tatek Hailemariamet. al vs. Ato Ayele Habteselasie cited in Mustefa Nasser Hassen, 
supra note 59, p. 31. 
85 These cases include Melaku’s case, Kedija case, Benshnguel case, W/ro Halima 
Mohamed v. Ato AdemAbdi, Ato Birhanu Regassa Urgi vs. MeskermMitiku; Emahoye 
G/Eyesus (SurafealZewdu’s Mother) Case and Ato Wesen Alemu et. al vs. The Amhara 
National Regional State (ANRS) Justice Professionals Training Institute case.  
86 Civil Servants Administrative Tribunal v. FDRE Revenues and Customs Authority and its 
Moyale Branch Office, File No. 2189/09 (Tir 8, 2011 E.C. (2019)) (Copy of case on file 
with the author) 
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corruption and disciplinary issues. According to the Regulation, such decision is 
not subject to any judicial review. However, the CCI indicated that the judiciary 
can be limited from judicial review by a Parliament in a Parliamentary form of 
government. It noted that the Regulation does not violate access to justice and 
the legislator has discretion to limit the justiciability of a case.  
However, CCI has changed its interpretation in Civil Servants Administrative 
Tribunal vs. FDRE Revenues and Customs Authority and its Moyale Branch 
Office. The case was referred to CCI by the Civil Servant Tribunal challenging 
the constitutionality of the same Regulation which prohibits the judiciary from 
reviewing the decision of the Director General of Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customd Authority to dismiss an employee. The Tribunal requested CCI to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the provision of the Regulation in light of 
Articles 37(1) and 20(4) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 14(3)(b)(e) of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These provisions provide access to 
justice and ensure the rights of accused persons to have access to any evidence 
against them, to adduce evidence in defence and to examine any witness against 
the accused. CCI held that the prohibition of judicial review on the decision of 
the Director General to dismiss an employee is contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution and international human rights instruments.87 The inconsistency 
observed in the two decisions is, inter alia, related with lack of well-defined 
approaches/principles of interpretation. 
4.2 Decisions that depart from human rights principles  
There are cases which are not decided in tandem with human rights because of 
inconsistent approaches in interpretation. Most of these cases were rejected by 
CCI for lack of the need for constitutional interpretation although the cases 
should have been entertained by CCI/HoF. In a second case involving Melku 
Fenta, he was not allowed to benefit from a legal provision favourable to his 
case. Under the Customs Proclamation, which came into force after the 
accusation of Melaku Fenta et al in a corruption case, it is provided that some of 
the customs violations (the defendants were accused of) no longer carry criminal 
liability. This prompted the defence team to cite the constitutional principle of a 
more favourable law to apply in their case and sought constitutional 
interpretation.88 However, the case was dismissed by CCI as it does not involve 
constitutional interpretation.  
In Negaso case, Proclamation No. 255/2001 (which denies a former president 
from getting benefits he used to get for participating in politics) was challenged 
and brought before CCI. Former President Dr. Negasso was denied to benefit 
from entitlements provided under the Proclamation for former presidents 
                                           
87 Ibid. 
88 Melaku’s case, File no. 1421/07, Council of Constitutional Inquiry. 
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because he participated as an independent candidate in an election. CCI held 
that the Proclamation does not contradict with the Constitution for prohibiting a 
former president from getting the benefits where he/she engages in political 
activities.89 In the CUD case90 indicated earlier, the Federal First Instance Court 
had requested whether the directive issued by the late Prime Minister after the 
2005 elections restricting the right to assembly, demonstration and petition in 
Addis Ababa for a month is constitutional. The CCI in its brief decision rejected 
the cases stating that it does not involve constitutional interpretation since the 
Prime Minister is the highest executive vested with wide powers based on 
Articles 49, 72(1) and 74(13) of the FDRE Constitution.  
Abdi Jibril argued that the decision erred by failing to distinguish between 
limitation and suspension of rights. The decision considered the restriction on 
the right to assembly, demonstration and petition as limitation.91 In another case 
involving the Anti-corruption Proclamation which denies the right to bail for all 
accused of corruption, the CCI held that the applicant’s right to bail is not 
violated by the Proclamation.92 The trend of the CCI to reject cases after making 
a determination of whether there is a constitutional violation by interpreting 
constitutional provisions has indeed adversely affected the rights of the 
complainants. As the CCI is not a body that is entrusted to make final decision 
on constitutional interpretation, these cases should have been referred to HoF for 
final decision. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that CCI and HoF 
have rendered some decisions that have duly involved valid constitutional 
interpretation. However, consistent interpretation on similar issues is clearly 
lacking in politically sensitive cases as manifested in the CUD case, Melaku’s 
case and Negaso’s case. Such selective approaches of CCI/HoF are nurtured and 
aggravated by the lack of principles/approaches of constitutional interpretation. 
5. Conclusion 
Lack of coherence and consistency in the decision of the CCI and HoF is 
attributable to lack of rules that provide guiding principles of constitutional 
interpretation. The failure of CCI and HoF in applying the correct constitutional 
interpretation method in evaluating the constitutionality of legislation has 
                                           
89 The case of the former FDRE President Negasso in House of Federation, Journal of 
Constitutional Decisions, 2009 E.C. (2017), Vol. 2 (2),  p. 36-41. 
90 Coalition for Unity and Democracy vs. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres, Fed. First 
Instance Ct., Lideta Div., File No. 54024 (Decision of 3 June 2005) (26 Ginbot 1997 E.C.) 
91 Abdi Jibril Ali (2012), ‘Distinguishing Limitation on Constitutional Rights from their 
Suspension: A Comment on the CUD Case’, Haramaya Law Review, p. 2. 
92 Adem, supra note 11, p. 86. 
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resulted in inconsistent decisions. The CCI and HoF have in most instances 
failed to apply the balancing and proportionality test. Lack of rules on 
constitutional interpretation is susceptible to discretionary patterns of 
interpretation driven by the political and personal whims rather than valid, 
consistent and predictable legal analysis.  
Adem argues that the CCI and HoF have been “simplistic and unsystematic” 
in constitutional interpretation and he noted that “one can clearly see that the 
Council engages in justifying government action rather than reviewing it 
critically”.93 Members of the HoF are regularly changed based on elections, and 
HoF meets only twice a year. Moreover, its size makes it “unsuited to follow a 
principled, coherent, reasoned and detailed approach to constitutional 
interpretation”.94 Various scholars argue that the HoF which is political organ is 
unfit for constitutional interpretation because its members lack the qualification, 
expertise and experience in constitutional law and interpretation. Although the 
CCI is established to address this gap, the HoF has the final say on cases that 
involve constitutional interpretation and may not properly examine and analyse 
the recommendations of CCI and duly accept, vary or reject them based on their 
merit.  
Furthermore, the CCI and HoF have frequently acted as adjudicatory bodies 
by going ultra vires and applying the constitutional provisions to questions of 
fact on cases referred to them for constitutional interpretation by courts. These 
tendencies of CCI/HoF which are political organs adversely affect the separation 
of powers among the state institutions. It also affects the rights of citizens who 
should be exclusively adjudicated before an independent judiciary rather than a 
political organ. The alleviation of these challenges requires the formulation and 
adoption of rules of procedure and principles that guide constitutional 
interpretation. In the absence of such institutional schemes, CCI and HoF can 
find it difficult to render consistent, predictable and coherent decisions.            ■ 
                                           
93 Id., p. 88. 
94 Id., p. 89. 
